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STUDENT COMMENTS
PRAYING FOR RELIEF FROM PARENS PATRIAE:
SHOULD A CHILD BE ALLOWED TO REFUSE LIFE-
SAVING MEDICAL TREATMENT ON RELIGIOUS
GROUNDS?
DAVID N. KESSLER*
In People ex rel. D.L.E., the Colorado Supreme Court was
faced with a boy who, when 14 years old, refused to take
medicine to control his epileptic seizures.' In addition, his
mother refused to require him to take the medicine.' As a
result, D.L.E. had a series of seizures which, among other in-
juries, caused permanent damage to his left arm and leg.'
The undisputed medical testimony was that such seizures
were life-threatening, if not medically treated. The court
found D.L.E. to be a neglected child and remanded the case
to the district court where an order would be entered requir-
ing D.L.E.'s medical treatment.'
A further fact of interest was noted by the court: D.L.E.
refused to take his medicine for religious reasons.' "Neither
D.L.E. nor his mother believes that medical treatment is war-
ranted for his condition. They both believe that prayer and
assistance by church elders will improve his condition."'
D.L.E. and his mother were members of the General Assem-
bly and Church of the First Born, the tenets of which in-
cluded the requirement to "eschew medical care or treat-
ment" and rely on "faith healing."" Both D.L.E. and his
mother, therefore, objected to the court's ordering treat-
* B.A. 1973, Dickinson College; Ph.D. 1983, University of Notre
Dame; J.D. 1986, University of Notre Dame; Thos. J. White Scholar, 1984-
1986.
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ment. Their grounds for this were that to require medical
treatment for D.L.E. was a violation of the free exercise
clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution."
The court, though, decided that such an order would not
violate the First Amendment guarantee of free exercise of re-
ligion because when the state is "[a]cting to guard the gen-
eral interest in the youth's well being, [its] authority . . . as
parens patriae,'° is not nullified merely because a parent
grounds his claim to control the child's . . . conduct on reli-
gion . . . .."1 In particular, "a parent's election against medi-
cal treatment for a child is not absolute in a life-endangering
situation."' 2
In many ways the resolution of D.L.E.'s case was similar
to others concerning a child in need of medical treatment
who, because of his parents' religious objections, had not
been receiving it.'s However, three aspects of D.L.E. were
surprising and important. The first was the judicial recogni-
tion that D.L.E. himself objected to the medical treatment on
religious grounds.14 The second was that the court noted
(when referring to an earlier case involving D.L.E.) that
D.L.E. had, in its opinion, a limited right to refuse medicine
on religious grounds." The third circumstance which de-
serves mention was that the court made absolutely no at-
tempt to determine whether its decision infringed upon
D.L.E.'s right to religious freedom by the decision in this
case. The court's decision was based solely on the finding that
D.L.E.'s mother had no right of refusal, on religious
grounds, for her son.1 6
The issue raised, but neither fully addressed nor, a forti-
ori, answered by the Colorado Supreme Court, is the subject
of this essay: Does a child, at any time prior to his majority,17
9. Id. at 275. "Congress shall make no law. . . prohibiting the free
exercise [of religion]" U.S. Const. amend. 1.
10. " 'Parens patriae,' literally 'parent of the country,' refers tradi-
tionally to role of state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal
disability." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979).
11. 645 P.2d 271, 276.
12. Id.
13. Cf People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 I1. 618, 104 N.E.2d
769 (1952); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962); In re
Clark, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 86, 185 N.E.2d 128 (1962).
14. 645 P.2d 271, 272, 274.
15. Id. at 272 (citing People ex tel. D.L.E., 200 Colo. 244, 614 P.2d
873 (1980)).
16. Id. at 275-76.
17. For a current chart listing the ages of majority and other perti-
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have the constitutionally protected right to refuse medical
treatment on religious grounds?8
I will begin to answer this question by presenting the ar-
guments in favor of such a right for children. Assuming, for
the moment, the success of these arguments, the limits of the
presumed right will be investigated through an analysis of the
leading cases in which adults have been recognized as having
the right to refuse medical treatment on the basis of their
religious beliefs. Also analyzed, of course, will be those cases
in which that right has been denied to adults. Typically, the
adult's right will be denied only if that adult is needed as a
parent for a young child. Otherwise, with the exception of
the incompetent, an adult has the right to refuse even life-
saving treatment on religious grounds.
In the course of this discussion of an adult's rights, I will
criticize the claim made by some authors that competent
adults ought never to be allowed to refuse treatment. Show-
ing this view to be in error will leave intact an adult's right to
refuse treatment. The dimensions of the adult's right deline-
ated, a child's right should be co-extensive unless overriding
considerations can be found.
That there are such overriding considerations is the
topic of the succeeding section. I argue that refusing life-sav-
ing medical treatment is so significant a decision that special
care must be taken to avoid allowing that decision to be made
by those who are unable to make it. My claim is that the con-
siderations in favor of children having the right of refusal fail
to show that children have the capacity to make such
decisions.
Nonetheless, the religious rights of older children surely
exist and must be protected. Older children can have reli-
gious beliefs,19 and if a person can have religious beliefs, gov-
nent information, see Capron, The Competence of Children as Self-Deciders in
Biomedical Interventions, in WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CHILD? 57, 95-114 (1982).
18. I shall not deal with the right to refuse treatment on the basis of
a right to privacy. For an overview of that topic, see Note, The Minor's
Right to Consent to Medical Treatment: A Corollary of the Constitutional Right of
Privacy, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1417 (1975).
19. It may be assumed that the very young child-the infant-has no
religious rights of free expression of his own. Infants lack, after all, even
the ability to believe the propositions which they would have to affirm if
they had religious beliefs. So it is impossible for an infant to have religious
attitudes. An infant has, therefore, no rights of his own regarding religion.
(His parents may have the right to raise him in a religious manner, but that
is their right, not the child's.) This does not mean the infant has no rights
of any kind. By analyzing a representative case in which an infant's parents
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ernment should, other things being equal, protect them. The
issue becomes, then, determining the point at which the
older child gains the right to have his religious activity pro-
tected as fully as is that of an adult.
There is, of course, an obvious solution: all minors will
be treated as the infant is treated; adult rights are acquired
only on the attainment of the child's majority. I will later ar-
gue that this solution is too restrictive and is insensitive to the
religious beliefs an older minor can have. I will argue, on the
other hand, that status as a "mature minor" is insufficient to
grant the right to refuse life-saving treatment. This appears
again to put the time at which this religious right is recog-
nized and protected by the state at one's majority. If a ma-
ture minor ought not have this right, it might be said, surely
no other minor should. Thus, only an adult ought to have it.
However, the child need not wait for his majority. Rather, I
will maintain that the time at which the child is emancipated
is the proper time to begin to protect his right to choose, on
religious grounds, to refuse life-saving medical treatment.
I. CONSIDERATIONS IN FAVOR OF OLDER CHILDREN HAVING A
RELIGIOUS RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT
An older child, at least, can have sincerely held religious
beliefs. That this is so is supported by the recognition given
such beliefs by the various branches of both Christianity and
Judaism which allow a youngster to acquire the responsibili-
ties of full membership in the religion. 0
The view could be held that the state, too, should recog-
nize the possibility of significant belief long before the child's
majority.21 Indeed, it might be argued this recognition has
already occurred. In Tinker v. Des Moines School District,2 the
try to refuse him medical treatment on the basis of their own religious con-
victions, it will become clear that the parents' religious rights cannot out-
weigh the infant's right to live. See infra section IV.
20. See, e.g., THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE JEWISH RELIGION 57 (1966)
and 4 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 149-50 (1967).
21. The argument is clearly not as easy to make as at least one author
thinks, however. "From . . . the fact that [constitutional] rights are availa-
ble to all persons . . . [and from] the judicial recognition that children are
persons . . . [it follows that children] are entitled to the same constitu-
tional rights as adults." Avrunin, The Right of Minors to Freedom of Religion,
62 MICH. B.J. 441 (1983). Avrunin here assumes no considerations override
the religious rights a child has. I argue infra section III that there are such
considerations.
22. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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Court held that public school students, aged 13, 15, and 16,
had a constitutionally protected right to free speech. This
right required school officials to allow the students to wear
armbands in school as a form of political protest. The Court,
then, has recognized that some youngsters have political or
philosophical opinions which are worthy of constitutional
protection. It is difficult, if not impossible, to see any signifi-
cant difference between the ability to have such opinions and
the ability to have sincere religious beliefs. But, if that is so,
then the latter should have constitutional protection along
with the former.
There are other reasons-reasons of consistency-for
the state to recognize the constitutional right of freedom of
religious exercise for children. A number of constitutional
provisions and protections have been applied to minors. For
example, the right to counsel and the privilege against self-
incrimination were both found to apply to teenagers in In re
Gault.28 Other recognized rights and protections have in-
cluded the reasonable-doubt standard as applicable to pro-
ceedings involving a juvenile charged with violating a crimi-
nal law24 and due process protection when faced with
suspension from school. 5 It is not implausible to suppose that
the application of these constitutional protections to children
increases the likelihood that courts will and should also apply
the free exercise clause to children.
Indeed, children are deferred to in an increasing number
of official situations. They may be called as witnesses.26 And
they may choose their own guardians.27 Both of these abilities
23. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
24. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
25. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). For a further list of deci-
sions, see Note, Choosing for Children: Adjudicating Medical Care Disputes Be-
tween Parents and the State, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157 (1983). For an overview of
the Burger Court's attitude toward children's rights, see Note, Children's
Rights under the Burger Court: Concern for the Child but Deference to Authority,
60 NoRE DAME L. REV. 1214 (arguing that the Burger Court neither has
broadened nor will significantly extend the rights of children).
26. "Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise
provided .... ." FED. R. EVID. 601. A state law may prohibit children
under a certain age from testifying. However, children as young as four
have been found competent. See, e.g., In re Lewis, 88 A.2d 582 (D.C. 1952).
27. At common law, a child could choose a guardian when the child
was fourteen years old. The age now varies according to statute. With
some qualifications, children as young as eleven have chosen their guardi-
ans. See In re Howard, 66 N.M. 445, 349 P.2d 547 (1960). See also S.H. v.
R.L.H., 289 S.E.2d 186 (W.Va. 1982); In re Estates of Carrigan, 517
S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
19861
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
are conferred on very young children as well as those who
are older. The responsibility involved in these activities
makes it reasonable to think that at least older children could
handle the responsibility of religious freedom. Thus, it might
be argued as well that older children have the right to refuse
medical care on religious grounds.
If older children are to have this right, the extent of the
right they would have must be determined. Perhaps it is best
to begin by determining the extent of the right as it applies
to adults.
II. THE LIMITS OF AN ADULT'S RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL
TREATMENT ON RELIGIOUS GROUNDS
In In re Estate of Brooks,2" the court denied the propriety
of forcing a patient to receive a blood transfusion when that
procedure (although judged medically necessary to save her
life) was contrary to the patient's religious convictions. The
patient was Bernice Brooks, a Jehovah's Witness. The Jeho-
vah's Witnesses interpret the Bible as prohibiting any blood
transfusion. Bernice Brooks was married and the mother of
two adult children. 9 Both she and her husband had signed a
release regarding any civil liability of the doctors or the hos-
pital for not giving her the transfusion.30 Finally, although
the patient may not have been competent at all times in the
hospital, the doctor in charge of the case clearly knew of Mrs.
Brooks' views on blood transfusions and of her desire never
to be subject to one."
The court put the issue this way:
When .. .a theretofore competent adult without minor
children ...[is] properly ...said to be incompetent, may
she be judicially compelled to accept treatment of a nature
which will probably preserve her life, but which is forbid-
den by her religious convictions, and which she has previ-
ously steadfastly refused to accept, knowing death would re-
sult from such refusal?2
To answer this question, the court asked whether this ex-
ercise of religious freedom "endangers, clearly and presently,
28. 32 III.2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
29. Id. at 436.
30. Id. at 437.
31. Id. at 442.
32. Id. at 438.
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the public health, welfare or morals"' s and concluded that it
did not. 4 Further, as no minor children were involved, there
was no question of the state's having "an overriding interest
in the welfare of the mother . . . [to avoid the situation
where] the children might become wards of the State."3 5 The
court found, then, that all that was involved here was an in-
terference with Mrs. Brooks' religious freedom with no com-
pelling state interest to justify it. As such, interference was
impermissible.36
In re Osborne31 reached the same result as Brooks, even
though minor children were involved. Here the court found
that Charles P. Osborne, a Jehovah's Witness, thirty-four
years old, married, and the father of two young children, was
entitled to refuse a blood transfusion deemed necessary to
save his life because, first, his children would be taken care of
by his family in the event of his death, and second, his reli-
gious choice was competently made and clearly precluded
even the merely passive acceptance of a court-ordered trans-
fusion as religiously intolerable.3 8 Without some compelling
33. Id. at 441.
34. Id. at 442.
35. Id.
36. Id. For a good, brief analysis of this case, see Authorization of In-
voluntary Blood Transfusion for Adult Jehovah's Witness Held Unconstitu-
tional-In re Brooks' Estate, 64 MICH. L. REV. 554 (1966). At the end of the
article, regarding the court's interest in avoiding grave danger to the state,
the author asks what the outcome would be if someone who was vital to a
nationwide security or health program attempted to refuse treatment. The
author suggests that, legally, the person could (and would) be kept alive
against his own wishes and, further, that this would be morally
unacceptable.
The reasoning in Brooks was reproduced in In re Melideo, 88 Misc.2d
974, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1976), where the patient was a 23-year-old mar-
ried woman who was neither pregnant nor had any children. Id. She also
was a Jehovah's Witness. Id. at 974, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 524. The court held
that, without a compelling state interest, the competent adult's decision to
refuse treatment (in this case, a blood transfusion) must be respected. Id. at
975, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 524.
37. 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
38. Id. at 375. That some Jehovah's Witnesses appear willing to ac-
cept transfusions, although refusing to authorize them, has led to some
confusion among commentators. Thus, for example, in Abraham, Religion,
Medicine, and the State: Reflections on Some Contemporary Issues, 22 J. CHURCH
& ST. 423 (1980), the suggestion is made that the court can solve these
blood transfusion difficulties by having the judge order the transfusion and
take whatever sin there is on himself. (Abraham's suggestion is not in the
context of transfusions for children, but the point remains the same as
some Jehovah's Witnesses believe that an involuntary transfusion on a baby
19861
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state interest to override the patient's choice, there was no
justification for interfering with the exercise of his religious
freedom.
These cases were rightly decided. When a competent
adult risks death in what he sees as the service of his God, the
state properly abstains from interference unless the adult's
action poses some danger to others. In support of this conclu-
sion, one might note that it meets John Stuart Mill's criterion
for allowable conduct: "That principle [which is to govern
the relationship between society and the individual] is that
the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually
or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any
of their number is self-protection." 39
Unfortunately, Mill's principle is notoriously slippery
when applied. Just what counts as self-protection-i.e. pre-
vention of harm-is exceedingly difficult to say. Almost any
action affects and possibly harms the rest of society. One
could argue that while Mill's principle looks as if it will sup-
port the decision to refuse treatment, in fact it supports the
opposite view. That is, the death of any person deprives ev-
eryone of the talents and abilities of that person. Such depri-
vation is harm. Therefore, refusing life-saving treatment is
impermissible on Mill's principle.4"
affects that baby's eternal life in a detrimental way.) Besides being some-
what condescending (Abraham puts the word "sin" in quotation marks
when referring to the ideas of the Jehovah's Witnesses), this solution will
not succeed in the many cases (Osborne being one) in which all transfu-
sions-whether voluntary or not-are seen as spiritually harmful.
39. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (C.V. Shields ed. 1956).
40. If Mill's approach leaves too much to be desired, a possible justifi-
cation in the Vatican II document, Dignitatis Humanae, could be
considered.
[A]ll men [are] bound by a moral obligation to seek the truth, es-
pecially religious truth .... However, men cannot discharge
these obligations in a manner in keeping with their own nature
unless they enjoy immunity from external coercion as well as psy-
chological freedom. Therefore, the right to religious freedom has
its foundation . . .in [man's] very nature .... [Thus,] the exer-
cise of this right [is not] to be impeded, provided that the just
requirements of public order are observed.
Second Vatican Council, Dignitatis Humanae, in D. O'BRIEN AND T. SHAN-
NON, RENEWING THE EARTH: CATHOLIC DOCUMENTS ON PEACE, JUSTICE, AND
LIBERATION 291, 293 (1977). That this is a statement in favor of religious
freedom is beyond question. Whether it can be used to support the free-
dom to act, in the name of religion, so as to cause the loss of one's own life
is far from clear. The argument, after all, claims that religious freedom is a
means to an end: truth. Dying ends that quest. So, on this view, self-sacri-
fice would appear to be impermissible.
I Vol. 2
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Even if Mill's argument fails, there may be a successful
method of showing the moral propriety of allowing relig-
iously-based refusal of life-saving treatment. The refusal of
medical treatment on religious grounds is an example of sac-
rificing oneself in the service of a principle higher than self-
preservation. The principle in this case is obedience to God.
Such a willingness to risk one's life can be compared with the
moral propriety of risking one's life in other situations.
Someone, perhaps because of friendship, may be willing to
sacrifice his life so that another may live, or someone may
willingly risk his life in a war to preserve the lives and free-
dom of others. These actions are clearly morally permissible
and even admirable. And each of these cases is an instance of
risking one's life for a value presumed to be more important
than self-preservation. If friendship and liberty can have such
a status, is it plausible to deny that obedience to God is also a
morally permissible principle for which to risk one's life?
The argument, then, for allowing adults to refuse life-
saving medical treatment on religious grounds has, at least,
two parts. One is that our society values allowing individuals
as much freedom as possible (within the constraints of having
an orderly community). But the primary reason is surely that
American society has always recognized the paramount im-
portance of certain principles which give meaning to life and
for which it is appropriate to risk death. Some of these prin-
ciples are secular, such as political freedom, and some are re-
ligious, but the recognition of their legitimacy is clear. If an
adult may properly risk his life in the cases under discussion,
then Brooks and Osborne were rightly decided.
Nonetheless, in both of those cases, the courts men-
tioned limits. The limits to an adult's right to refuse treat-
ment were competency and having young children in need of
care. These circumstances have in fact been present in sev-
eral important cases, and in these cases the patients who ob-
jected to medical treatment on religious grounds were
treated anyway. The cases deserve a review both to clarify
the criteria for refusing to allow rejection of treatment and
to see the abuse to which those criteria have been put.
The first of these cases, In re the President and Directors of
Georgetown College,41 involved a 25-year-old married woman
41. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964). For further analysis of this case,
see Milhollin, The Refused Blood Transfusion: An Ultimate Challenge for Law
and Morals, 10 NAT. L.F. 202 (1965); Note, Application of President & Direc-
tors of Georgetown College, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 399 (1965-66); Case Comment,
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who had a 7-month-old child. The woman was in need of a
blood transfusion, but because she was a Jehovah's Witness,
she refused to authorize the procedure.
This case is curious because of the way in which the
court reached its decision." The opinion mentions the state's
interest in preserving the mother's life so that she could care
for the infant. 3 But there is no investigation of the provi-
sions that might have been made by the family for the event
of her death." The woman's opposition to a transfusion is
also noted.45 It is countered by the poorly supported conclu-
sion that the woman was not competent. 41 Finally, having
presented little substantial argument, the court maintains
that the ultimate reason for allowing the transfusion over the
patient's objections was that "a life hung in the balance. ' 4
The general principles presented in this case are not so
controversial as their application to these particular facts. It
is reasonable to conclude that if a person is incompetent to
make a decision, the court may decide to protect that per-
son's life." Further, it is reasonable to be concerned about
the welfare of a small child who might lose a parent. While
the facts in Georgetown did not persuasively call for the appli-
cation of these principles, the general principles may never-
theless indicate circumstances which will override a claim of
religious freedom.
The contrast is startling between Georgetown and United
States v. George4" in terms of principles which could justify a
The Right to Die, 9 UTAH L. REv. 161 (1964).
42. Strictly, the controversy was not decided: "This opinion is being
written solely in connection with the emergency order . . . .It should be
made clear that no attempt is being made here to determine the merits of
the underlying controversy." 331 F.2d at 1007.
43. Id. at 1008.
44. Compare the court's behavior in Osborne. Admittedly, the time
constraints were a factor here, but the woman's husband could have been
asked about these things.
45. 331 F.2d at 1007.
46. The court advised the patient that the doctors agreed on the ne-
cessity of a transfusion. The opinion continues: "The only audible reply I
could hear was 'Against my will.' It was obvious that the woman was not in
a mental condition to make a decision." Id.
The court added that Mrs. Jones would not feel it was her responsibility
if the court forced her to have the transfusion. This would be more signifi-
cant had the court not decided that Mrs. Jones was incompetent before
discovering what her views were on responsibility.
47. Id. at 1009.
48. Id. at 1008.
49. 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965).
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conclusion. In the Georgetown case, the correct principles, if
not the appropriate facts, were present. In George, neither
were available. Elishas George, a Jehovah's Witness, 39 years
old, married, and the father of four children, refused to au-
thorize a blood transfusion required to save his life. 50 The
court ordered the transfusion, even though it found George
to be "coherent, rational" in appearance.5 '
The justification for this decision is not easy to discover.
The court makes no argument concerning the children;
rather, it offers several minor comments in justification of its
action. The first of these, that the liability waiver could not
"with certainty" be said to be effective, seems to be mere
quibbling. 52 The second, that doctors must be free to follow
the dictates of their own consciences in medical proce-
dures-and that this freedom outweighs the freedom to exer-
cise one's religious beliefs as one chooses-is sophistical at
best.53 Finally, the third justification (reminiscent of Ge-
orgetown) is that the patient did not think God would hold
him responsible for the transfusion if the court forced him to
have it.54 George indicated he "would rather die than agree
to a transfusion.15 5 But this, presumably, did not impress the
court, which challenged him to resist the court by placing his
hand over the area to be injected. The court apparently took
George's failure to do this as indicating a lack of sincerity on
his part or that the belief was unimportant to him. In any
case, the transfusion was given.
This case fails to provide acceptable reasons for overrid-
ing the patient's wishes. The court never presents any signifi-
cant reasons for contravening George's freedom of religion.
A one-sentence attempt to indicate lack of competency is
50. Id. at 753.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 754.
53. The court opined that "The patient may knowingly decline treat-
ment, but he may not demand mistreatment." Id. In addition, requiring
"these doctors to ignore the mandates of their own conscience, even in the
name of free religious exercise, cannot be justified under these circum-
stances." Id. The notion that the doctors' consciences are more important
than Mr. George's freedom of religion is surely in need of supporting argu-
ment. It appears to be a seriously faulty comparison of the two values.
54. Id. at 753.
55. Id.
56. Id. The insincerity of the court in this exchange with Mr. George
is astonishing. At one point the court said to him that "it had no power to
force a transfusion upon him .... "Id. Given the outcome of the case, it
is hard to take this seriously.
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lacking in any persuasive force. 7 Had the court been able to
show the danger of the children becoming state wards, then
the conclusion of the case might seem more plausible. As it
stands, though, the court fails to justify its action. Its deci-
sion, therefore, is unacceptable.
A third case of this sort, John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospi-
tal v. Heston,58 again has a Jehovah's Witness refusing a trans-
fusion. This was a 22-year-old, unmarried woman whom the
court ordered transfused. In this instance, though, there was
some genuine doubt about Miss Heston's beliefs, as she was
apparently in shock when admitted to the hospital and re-
mained incompetent until after the transfusion was given. 59
And incompetency surely precludes a refusal of treatment by
the patient.
Lastly, Fitkin Memorial Hospital v. Anderson60 deserves
mention, for there was a compelling state interest when the
state determined to transfuse Mrs. Anderson, a 20-year-old
Jehovah's Witness. Mrs. Anderson was eight months preg-
nant at the time and "the welfare of the child and the
mother are so intertwined and inseparable that it would be
impracticable to attempt to distinguish between them."6
The preceding cases show that an adult's right to refuse
life-saving treatment on religious grounds is legally limited.
When there is a compelling reason given to do so, the state
may override the right to free exercise of religion. The two
legitimate, compelling reasons are clear: (1) the protection of
the patient himself, when truly incompetent and his views on
the procedure have not been reliably obtained by his doctors;
and (2) the protection of the quality of life of the patient's
57. "Psychiatric reports indicated the patient showed a lack of con-
cern for life, and a somewhat fatalistic attitude about his condition was de-
scribed as 'a variant of suicide.' " Id. Since no further explanation is given,
one can only imagine the reality behind this statement. Still, is it too much
to believe that Mr. George's concern with eternal life and with obeying
God would be described by a certain kind of doctor as showing "a lack of
concern for life, and a somewhat fatalistic attitude..
58. 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971).
59. Under such circumstances, the life-saving treatment was never re-
fused. There was evidence, though, of Miss Heston's beliefs given by a card
she carried which stated that she would refuse blood transfusions. The dif-
ficulty with such cards is that when one changes one's mind, the card may
still remain. In a life-or-death situation, relying on a card to justify re-
fraining from treatment may be a serious error, at least when recovery is
possible with treatment.
60. 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964).
61. Id. at 423, 201 A.2d at 538.
[Vol. 2
PARENS PATRIAE
children-keeping children from becoming dependent on
the state for essential care.
It is obvious that incompetency must be a basis for refus-
ing the requests of the patient. The need for the parent to
care for the child is not so clear, although I think it is defen-
sible. A child will, presumably, receive better care from his
parent than from the state, but whether this benefit to the
child is sufficient to outweigh the interference with the par-
ent's religious liberty is a judgment far more difficult to make
than most legal decisions indicate. If the child is quite young,
then his right to and need for parental care (assuming no one
else in the family is capable of caring properly for him) prob-
ably does outweigh the parent's religious freedom. However,
in situations with older children whose need for care is less,
interference with the parent's choice should be taken with
greater reluctance. It may be that at some point the parent's
choice should be given preference. This is by no means cer-
tain, but it would be reassuring if the courts would occassion-
ally consider the possibility. That they do not do so leaves
one with the impression that they are merely looking for an
excuse-rather than a justification-for preventing the par-
ent from risking his life.
In view of the legal and moral limits of the adult's right
to refuse treatment, an objection to the existence of that
right deserves attention. The objection is that society's inter-
est in the life of its members will always outweigh any right to
freely practice one's religion, when that freedom is supposed
to include the right to refuse life-saving medical treatment.62
If K.F. Hegland is right, then neither adults nor, of course,
children can have this right of refusal.
Hegland claims that there is no general right to refuse
medical treatment on religious grounds, even though there is
nothing to indicate that such a refusal endangers others."' To
justify this, Hegland presents three categories of behavior
prohibited by the state (euthanasia, snake-handling in reli-
gious rituals, and suicide) and argues that the state properly
prevents these activities even though they harm no one other
than those freely involved. With these prohibitions as prece-
dent, Hegland maintains that the reasons for disallowing such
behavior are identical with those for disallowing some-
one-even a competent adult-from refusing life-saving
62. Comment, Unauthorized Rendition of Lifesaving Medical Treatment,
53 CAL. L. REV. 860 (1965).
63. Id. at 867.
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medical treatment. I think Hegland is mistaken in his claims
and will briefly explain why.
Hegland defends the illegality of euthanasia on two
counts. The first "is society's interest in the life of the indi-
vidual"; the second, that an exception to the notion of "the
sanctity of life cannot but cheapen it."64
Hegland has overstated his case. It is true that societies
have (or ought to have) an interest in the life of each individ-
ual; but there are some clear limits to this idea, as Hegland
interprets it, that one ought not let another die if one can
help it. Consider a terminally ill patient whose life can be
slightly prolonged only by extremely painful means. Hegland,
who rejects the distinction between killing someone and let-
ting him die, 5 would have to reject the judgment that society
could properly let such a person refuse further treatment.
But, allowing that patient to reject such treatment seems ex-
actly right." If, in that case, there is a reason for overriding
society's interest in the individual's life, perhaps there is such
a reason in the religious refusal as well. Hegland has failed to
rule out that possibility.
The second notion, that of cheapening the value of life,
is acceptable as an overriding concept only if-in the circum-
stances-the value of life really is cheapened. Given someone
who rejects treatment because of allegiance to what he be-
lieves is God's command, the idea that the value of life is
cheapened by allowing death can only be maintained if one
supposes that continued living is always the highest good.
There may be superior values-fidelity, honesty, free-
dom-which may have to be protected at the sacrifice of
one's life. Unfortunately, Hegland overlooks this possibility.
Hegland next attempts to argue for disallowing an adult
the right to refuse treatment on religious grounds by noting
64. Id.
65. Id. at 868.
66. Even those most opposed to euthanasia usually grant the legiti-
macy of such a case. For example,
When inevitable death is imminent in spite of the means used, it is
permitted in conscience to take the decision to refuse forms of
treatment that would only secure a precarious and burdensome
prolongation of life, so long as the normal care due to the sick
person in similar cases is not interrupted.
VATICAN CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DECLARATION ON
EUTHANASIA 10 (1980). See also Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against
Proposed "Mercy-Killing" Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 969 (1958), reprinted
in part as Euthanasia Legislation: Some Nonreligious Objections, in ETHICAL IS-
SUES IN DEATH AND DYING 220 (T.L. Beauchamp and S. Perlin eds. 1978).
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that churches which practice snake-handling as part of their
ritual have been legally prohibited from doing so partly on
the basis that it is dangerous to those who participate.67
While this is true, it does not necessarily lead to the conclu-
sion which Hegland suggests. Given the same facts, one
might claim that the snake-handlers have been wrongly
treated. The freedom to risk one's life to witness to one's re-
ligious beliefs may be claimed to be a higher value than the
protection of one's life from danger. While the snake cases
present the same issue as the refusal of treatment cases (the
possibility of death as an unwanted side-effect of obeying a
religious injunction), the fact that such snake-handling was
prohibited does not settle the issue-it merely raises it in a
different form.
Finally, Hegland compares refusal of treatment to suicide
which, he notes, it is legal to prevent. 8 Hegland's argument,
however, suffers from never fully confronting the obvious
distinction between most suicides and the refusal of medical
treatment: the former is an act usually performed by some-
one who is in an irrational state of mind, the latter is a princi-
pled decision that some things are more important than life
itself. Hegland does mention this distinction, but his argu-
ment against it begs the question. He writes:
Take, for example, two hospital patients both in dire need
of blood transfusions. One rejects them because of a desire
to die, the other because of religious conviction. Should the
law allow the patient wishing to live but preferring death to
breach of religious faith, to die, while forcing the one wish-
ing to die, to live? To ask the question is to answer it."
Obviously, though, the question has not been answered until
the values of protecting religious obedience and that of main-
taining life are weighed. That the weighing will always favor
the latter is Hegland's conclusion. Unfortunately, it is also his
assumption, and so his argument is less than persuasive.
A second article which argues for compulsory medical
treatment has no better a presentation of the issues.7 In-
67. E.g. Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 473, 164 S.W.2d 972
(1942); Harden v. State, 188 Tenn. 17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1948). See also
State ex. rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1973), cert. denied 424
U.S. 954 (1976).
68. Comment, supra note 62, at 869.
69. Id. at 871.
70. Note, Compulsory Medical Treatment and the Free Exercise of Reli-
gion, 42 IND. L.J. 386 (1967).
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deed, in some ways it is worse. This author contends, for ex-
ample that any action which one undertakes knowing one is
going to die is, by that fact alone, suicide. 1 This is not an
idiosyncratic definition,'2 but it is a less than helpful one,
uniting, as it does, actions which are undertaken with the in-
tention of dying with actions which the person performed
when death is forseen, but not intended. To tie such different
concepts together is to contribute to a confusion which
merely muddles an already difficult analysis.
Elsewhere, the author suggests, apparently to mitigate
the appearance of interfering with the religious practices of
others, that denying a Jehovah's Witness the right to refuse a
life-saving blood transfusion is only a slight restriction. "The
doctrine forbidding transfusions does not appear to be a fun-
damental belief in the Jehovah's Witnesses' religion. It is not
part of the religious ceremony, and its absence will not pre-
vent continued practice of the religion.""3 That the author
should imply that a belief is not particularly important in a
religion, when the adherents of that religion are willing to
die rather than contravene it, is astonishing. One of the few
things more astonishing would be to base a legal or moral
prohibition of refusal of treatment on such an argument. In
addition, the author's point fails to address the refusal of
treatment by members of those religions where such a tenet
is undoubtedly central-Christian Science, for example.
These attempts to deny anyone the right to refuse medi-
cal treatment clearly have failed. Given the arguments ear-
lier, we are now left with the view that adults, subject to limi-
tations of competency and provisions for minors in their care,
can legitimately reject treatment.
When asking to what extent a minor might have the
right to refuse treatment, one might argue that the same lim-
its apply: if competent and with no children of his own to
support, the minor can refuse treatment. If there is no differ-
ence between adults and most older children on the question
of religious freedom, then treating them identically is only
right. In the next section, however, I will raise some
71. Id. at 396.
72. It is, in fact, Emile Durkheim's definition. "Suicide is applied to
all cases of death resulting directly or indirectly from a positive or negative
act of the victim himself, which he knows will produce this result." E.
DURKHEIM, SUICIDE 44 (J.A. Spaulding & G. Simpson trans. 1951) quoted in
Margolis, Suicide, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN DEATH AND DYING 92 (T.L.
Beauchamp and S. Perlin eds. 1978).
73. Note, supra note 41, at 402.
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problems for the view that adults and older children are, gen-
erally, on a par regarding religious rights.
III. CONSIDERATIONS OPPOSING THE RIGHT OF OLDER
CHILDREN TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT
The right to refuse, on religious grounds, life-saving
medical treatment is the right to make the decision that cer-
tain religious beliefs require the sacrifice of one's own life.
Can a child with a sincere religious belief have the qualities
required for an informed judgment concerning when his life
is no longer worth living? It may well be true that any child
with a sincere religious belief will have some marks of matur-
ity and independence. He may understand "submission to au-
thority, acceptance of responsibility, and the discharge of
duty."74 But such a character, with such religious beliefs, pro-
vides evidence primarily of the child's ability to follow rules
and guidelines. It is not evidence of the ability to understand
or make long-range decisions. In particular, the ability to.
decide that one will die rather than submit to a blood trans-
fusion is an ability without any necessary connection to the
requirements for membership in a religious group. A minor,
however mature, will hardly ever have an understanding of
what it means to live his life independently. He will hardly
ever have come to realize the worth of his life or be truly
able to measure that worth against his perceived religious
obligations.
Consider the decisions noted earlier. None of the rights
granted to children in those decisions-even those granted in
Tinker-require or even make it likely that the child has the
sort of judgment to make an informed life-or-death decision.
Being free to speak one's mind does not presuppose a high
level of judgment. Being able to say what one thinks and hav-
ing that right protected has almost no relation to being able
to judge the quality of one's life and to judge whether or not
to go on living (and having that right protected). Obviously,
74. Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Res-
ervations About Abandoning Youth to Their Rights, 3 B.Y.U L. REv. 605, 656
(1976).
75. Most religions-and current law-recognize this lack of foresight
in youngsters by discouraging or disallowing marriages for younger teenag-
ers. See, e.g., Wardle, Rethinking Marital Age Restrictions, 22 J. FAM. L. 1, 8
(1983-84) (no state allows marriage, without special permission, of men or
women under 18). In the United States, nearly all religious groups follow
the legal guidelines, even when, in principle, earlier marriage is permitted.
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the other constitutional protections are even farther from
any idea of protecting someone's opinions or judgments.
They are purely procedural protections from which nothing
in particular can be deduced about the child's level of
maturity.
If the Supreme Court decisions provide no good reason
for extending freedom of religion, as it applies to adults, to
minors, what is to be said of D.L.E. who did not wish to take
the epilepsy medication? Or, what about Pamela Hamilton,
who did not wish, for religious reasons, to be treated for her
cancer?"' Traditionally, the solution has been to treat all mi-
nors as literal infants. That approach, therefore, must be
examined.
IV. MINORS AS INFANTS: THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN
FROM THE CHOICES OF THEIR PARENTS
The courts have been unanimous in denying a child's
parents the right to choose, on religious grounds, to forego
treatment for the child when that treatment is necessary to
sustain life.7 For example, in People ex rel. Wallace v.
Labrenz, 78 the court ordered a transfusion to save the life of
an eight-day-old infant whose Jehovah's Witnesses parents
had refused permission. Interestingly, the court noted the
mother's belief that a transfusion destroys "the baby's
chances for future life." The court did not accept the
mother's characterization of the situation, but that, at least in
theory, cannot be the reason for the court's decision. The
court is not allowed to decide the truth or falsity of the reli-
gious beliefs in question.7 9 So how did the court reach its
conclusion?
The usual answer to this is to say that the court is to de-
cide "in the best interests" of the child. Unfortunately, in
these circumstances, that phrase is ambiguous and ultimately
unhelpful. Either it includes spiritual interests, in which case
the court must make decisions which it is neither legally nor
theologically competent to make, or it includes only secular
values, such as life itself, which begs the question from the
beginning.
Some commentators have suggested the notion of "sub-
76. In re Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 425 (Tenn. App. 1983).
77. See, e.g., State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962); In
re Clark, 21 Ohio Op.2d 86, 185 N.E.2d 128 (1962).
78. 411 III. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952).
79. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
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stituted judgment": the court is to decide as the infant would
if it were competent. The obvious problem, though, is decid-
ing what that could mean. If its meaning requires a decision
about what this child would decide if he had an adult's capac-
ity, then the issue is far too speculative-what values is the
person to have? Those of his parents? Those of the court? Or
should the court decide for the child by substituting for the
parents' judgment the judgment of some "reasonable per-
son?" A reasonable Jehovah's Witness?
The proper way to characterize the court's decision is
not to look to "best interests" or "substituted judgment;"
rather, it is to think of two rights in conflict-the parents'
right to freedom of religion and the child's right to live. The
issue then becomes whether one person's religious freedom
can override another person's right to live. Put this way, it
seems obvious that it cannot. The alternative is to suppose
that one person's religious desire to sacrifice victims to a
bloodthirsty deity allows that person to kidnap someone off
the street to play the central role in his unusual ritual. The
absurdity of that view shows that the court, when choosing
between two conflicting rights in these situations, is correctly
choosing the infant's right to live as paramount.
The infant's right to live, then, is carefully protected
from any views harmful to that right which his parents may
have. And, of course, the courts need never ask about the
infant's religious views because infants cannot form such
opinions. Precisely here is the difference between older chil-
dren and infants. Older children can have religious attitudes
and beliefs. To treat them as if they cannot-to treat them as
infants is safe, because their right to live is always protected,
but not just, because their religious rights are ignored.
V. THE CRITERION FOR ALLOWING A CHILD TO REFUSE LIFE-
SAVING MEDICAL TREATMENT
The absurdity of the idea of treating all minors as infants
can be seen in Holmes v. Silver Cross Hospital.80 Ernest J.
Holmes, a Jehovah's Witness, was a 20-year-old married man
with a young child. During a period of undoubted compe-
tency, he informed the doctors of his refusal to accept a
needed blood transfusion. When, later, Holmes lost con-
sciousness, the lower court allowed him to be declared incom-
petent as a minor and appointed a conservator to authorize a
80. 340 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Iii. 1972).
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blood transfusion.81 The grounds for the lower court's action
do not appear in the opinion of the District Court. However,
merely being incompetent at some time or other is an insuffi-
cient ground for the court to override one's clearly expressed
desires. And this is surely true even though Holmes was a
minor and therefore legally not entitled to all of an adult's
rights. Indeed, the Holmes case is one which straightforwardly
suggests a way to decide which group of minors should be
granted the right to refuse life-saving treatment: the person
who should be allowed to make such a decision is one who
has begun living his own life and taking responsibility for the
direction of that life.
I suggest that, pragmatically, a line can be drawn be-
tween two groups of children who have not yet reached their
majority. The one group, which would receive all of the pro-
tections an adult receives, is precisely that group which is
adult in its level of responsibility for itself-the minors who
are emancipated82 from their parents and who are thus as re-
sponsible for themselves and for planning and living their
own lives as any normal adult. The other group is, of course,
the unemancipated one. The latter group's rights regarding
religion will be drawn short of allowing life-or-death deci-
sions, although not all rights would be denied, save in the
case of infants too young to have any views." There will be,
in a sense, degrees of freedom of religion. 4
81. Id. at 128.
82. "Emancipated minor [is a] person under 18 years of age who is
totally self-supporting." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 468 (5th ed. 1979).
"Emancipation . . . is principally used with reference to the emancipation
of a minor child by its parents, which involves an entire surrender of the
right to the care, custody, and earnings of such child as well as a renuncia-
tion of parental duties. The emancipation may be express, as by voluntary
agreement of parent and child, or implied from such acts and conduct as
import consent .... ." Id.
83. Obviously the unemancipated group will include "mature mi-
nors." These are children who are able to make important decisions
thoughtfully and are given, therefore, a special place in the law. See
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), for example. Should
these minors also have the right to refuse treatment? I think not. Maturity
is, of course, always desirable; but it does not necessarily include that sense
of one's own life which comes from being on one's own-being responsible
for oneself-and that is the understanding crucial for making a life-or-
death decision about oneself.
84. That "degrees" of a right is a workable idea may be seen by con-
sidering the decision in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985), in which
the right to privacy was held to be subject to various restrictions in scope in
light of the age of the person (among other factors).
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If I am correct about the importance of emancipation,
and if the notion of degrees of freedom is a defensible dis-
tinction, it will follow that D.L.E. did not have a constitution-
ally protected right to refuse to take his medication, nor
Pamela to refuse chemotherapy. Holmes, on the other hand,
clearly had the right to refuse the blood transfusion.
Line-drawing of this sort cannot produce perfect results,
although I think the line I have drawn is the most appropri-
ate one in these circumstances. There will be some, on either
side of the line, who could arguably be placed on the other.
Given the seriousness of the right in question and the lives at
stake, it is correct to draw the line high enough that only
those minors whose lives are their own will have the right,
and not low enough that all of those who could truly make
the decision will be allowed to do so. For, in order to achieve
the latter goal, some who are incompetent to decide would
have the right, and the consequence of that is a clearly unjus-
tified death.
Finally, the implications of minors having some degree of
protected rights regarding freedom of religion may have vast
importance for disputes between parent and child about the
child's religious education. 5 As far as rejection of life-saving
medical treatment is concerned, however, I think it cannot be
plausibly maintained that unemancipated minors have a
moral right to make such decisions. They should not have a
legal right to do so either.
85. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Avrunin, supra note 21, at 445.
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